

# Augustine's *De ordine* Revisited

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## *Introduction*

Soon after his resignation from the Milanese professorship of rhetoric in the late summer of 386, Augustine withdrew to the estate of Cassiciacum with his family and close friends. During the rural retreat to his friend's villa, the period between his conversion to Christianity in August 386 and his baptism in the spring of 387, he wrote the earliest pieces of work, that is, *Contra academicos*, *De beata uita*, *De ordine*, and the *Soliloquia*. These three dialogues (in discussion with his friends, his mother Monnica, and his son Adeodatus) and the *Soliloquia* (with his own *ratio*) reveal his primary interest in the philosophical-theological problems—the attainability of truth, happiness, providence, and the immortality of soul—which are to remain crucial and be orchestrated through the corpus of his writings.

The third literary work, *De ordine* which I have chosen in this paper, it is considered the written report of the discussions that took place at the villa, as well as the other two dialogues *Contra academicos* and *De beata uita*. It is clear from the long dedication to Zenobius that Augustine would converge on the problem of order in the world: there are two opposite viewpoints, from which arises an apparent discrepancy between divine providence, in which God rules all human affairs, and the spread of human perversity over the world.<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of his dedicatory letter, he thus reminds Zenobius of the cause of this difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

To perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then to see or to explain the order of the entire universe by which this world is truly held together and governed—that, Zenobius, is a very difficult and rare achievement for men.<sup>3</sup>

Augustine maintains that the cause derives from the lack of self-knowledge: 'man does not know himself.'<sup>4</sup> To resolve the difficulty, he enters into discussions with the participants about the double-barrelled question concerning the disorder and providence. During the three days' discussions, Augustine casts himself in the role of teacher for the debate with his disciples and his mother. By reflecting upon the disorder of his students' view of order, discussions are

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<sup>1</sup> *De ord.* 1.1.1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Retract.* 1.3.1.

<sup>3</sup> *De ord.* 1.1.3; trans. Robert Russell, in: FC 5, 239.

<sup>4</sup> *De ord.* 1.1.3; FC 5, 240.

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followed by a concluding speech (*oratio perpetua*) about the order of discipline and broken off when night falls in the third day.

*The Problem of Composition and the Setting Texts*

By drawing attention to the thread of the conversation in *De ordine*, the three days' discussions would be summarised thus:

Dedicatory letter (1.1-5)

Discussion at midnight (1.6-21)

Discussion A (1.6-21)	Augustinus-Licentius-Trygetius
Discussion A-1 (1.6-10: stepping stone)	Aug.—Lic.
Discussion A-2 (1.11-21: all exists in order)	Aug.—Lic.—Tryg.

Episode before noon on the first day (1.22-26)

Episode A (1.22-24: Lic. chants a Psalm)	Lic.—Monnica
Words of warning	Lic.—Aug.
Episode B (1.25-26: cocks fighting and Aug.'s reflection)	

Discussion on the second day (1.27-33)

Discussion B (1.27-29: definition of order)	Aug.—Lic.—Tryg.
Episode C (1.29-30: quarrel)	Lic.—Tryg.
Words of warning by Aug.	
Monologue A (1.31-33: philosophy and wisdom, towards Monnica)	

Discussion before noon on the third day (2.1-18)

Discussion C (2.2-11: definition of order)	
Discussion C-1 (2.2-7: <i>sapiens</i> knows himself)	Aug.—Lic.
Discussion C-2 (2.7: nature of memory)	Aug.—Lic.
Discussion C-3 (2.8-9: nature of <i>stultus</i> )	Alypius—Aug.
Discussion C-4 (2.10-11: nature of <i>stultus</i> )	Aug.—Tryg.
	[Absence of Lic.]
Monologue B (2.12-18: ignorance—order of discipline—demand of method)	
(2.18: problem posed)	[Lic. appears again.]

Discussion after noon on the third day (2.19-54)

Discussion D (2.19-24: on order)	
Discussion D-1 (2.19-21: to be without God)	Aug.—Lic.
Discussion D-2 (2.21: evil and divine providence)	Aug.—Lic.—Tryg.
Discussion D-3 (2.22-24: difficulty of divine providence)	Aug.—Lic.—Tryg.—Mon.
Interruption of the Discussion (2.24)	

Monologue C (2.24–27: divine law and twofold methods)

Interruption of the monologue (2.28–29)

Alyp.—Aug.

Monologue D (2.30–52: order of discipline)

Answer by Alyp. and the close (2.53–54)

Alyp.—Aug.

As evident in the synopsis given above, this dialogue consists of four parts: the prefatory letter, discussion (A–D), episode (A–C) and interruption, and monologue (A–D). After introducing the main topic in the letter, the author Augustine divides the following into these parts, though disproportionately. Its repetitious structure might allow the reader to approach his design: the way of combining the discussions with monologues and episodes seems to be part of the author’s intention. Indeed, not all participate in the discussions to the same extent. Augustine introduces his dialogue partners before the beginning of the conversation (1.2.5). Licentius is the primary speaker with Augustine, except his absence is suddenly referred to in discussion C-4 (2.3.10, 2.4.11). Like Licentius, Trygetius is also Augustine’s teenage student recently exempt from military service. His brother Navigius does not enter the conversation. Alypius (his friend and a former Manichaean together with him) has not been there for the first two days. His return is reported before discussion C (2.1.1) and only joins it once (2.3.8-9). These occasional comings and goings lead us to suppose that while each of the discussion parts would be the written report of their talks, the entire work follows the script by the author, in which he has decided its storyline: who, when, and what speaking occurs.

Hence, I suggest that his intention is relevant to the interpretation of this dialogue. So far as the author chooses these materials, he would not include unnecessary scenes into it. The occasional digressions must have a definite purpose within his plan. This is an utterly conventional view of the literary work. In this case, every word does not refer to the author’s opinion. His students’ statements would reflect their ideas at that time. This reading of *De ordine* is that Augustine follows the established tradition of Ciceronian and Varronian dialogues, the *mos dialogorum*, with which he shares significant features: the order and sequence, and the scenic setting of the dialogue. Concerning the former—the order and sequence, the author claims that this dialogue is a particular portion of the talks given at the villa. Referring to another dialogue (*De beata uita*), he seems to be at work to make it clear that this dialogue took place within the sequence of the Cassiciacum talks.<sup>5</sup> Also in *Contra academicos* (2.4.10), he states that participants ‘discontinued the discussion for about seven days’ between books 1 and 2. Later in the articles of these works (at *Retractationes*), Augustine explains that he composed both *De beata uita* and *De ordine* ‘not after, but between the books on the Academics’ (*Retr.* 1.2.1);

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<sup>5</sup> *De ord.* 2.1.1. See Kenyon 2011, 175–176.

'between those [books] which were written, *On the Academics*' (*Retr.* 1.3.1). Some scholars thus would fill this seven-days' break with both *De beata uita* and *De ordine*.

As well as the above characteristics, *De ordine* includes some scenic settings in the course of their conversations. The first discussion (A-1) begins under the mantle of a night at a villa's quarters: the room is still in darkness. Augustine is lying awake in his bed, starts talking with his pupils Licentius and Trygetius who are also waking there. (1.3.6) By considering the question of what is the cause of an irregular noise of 'water flowing past at the rear of the baths', Augustine maintains that 'the running of the waters reminded me to say something on the subject.' (1.3.7) In the following discussion that takes place between Augustine, Licentius and Trygetius (A-2), therefore, his students are encouraged to interpret the meaning of things and events in their surroundings. There are two episodes that Augustine reports before he summarises 'all the points of our nocturnal discussion' into the notebook (1.8.26): Licentius chants a passage from the Psalms in the latrine (1.8.22–24) and participants observe two cocks fighting on the way to the baths (1.8.25–26).

In the case of that chant, Augustine connects the latrine with the past night. While Monica scolds Licentius for singing it in an odd place (1.8.22), Augustine tells him it '[i]s not displeasing to me.' He continues to explain:

'And that we say something on that very point is, I believe, quite in accordance with order itself, for I see that the place itself by which Monica was offended, and the night also, have a fittingness with reference to that chant: for what, indeed, do you think that we pray to be converted to God and to see His face, if not from a certain uncleanness of the body and its stains, and likewise from the darkness in which error has involved us?'<sup>6</sup>

It is admitted that here Augustine reminds himself of the 'darkness in which error has involved us' as the discussion in the sleeping quarters where he 'had long sought the reason' of the irregular sound of that water and 'had not found why it was so.' (1.3.7) Both Augustine and Licentius were in the 'darkness' and the filth and dirt of the latrine. His words could be interpreted as the warning against the error from which they hope to distance themselves.

In the case of the gazing at the fight scene, Augustine describes their attention to the stage as the search of the 'eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty]':

Suddenly, we noticed barnyard cocks beginning a bitter fight just in front of the door. We chose to watch. For what do the eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty] not encompass; where do they not search through to see beauteous reason signaling something thence?—reason which rules and governs all things, the knowing and the unknowing things, and which attracts her eager followers in every way and wherever

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<sup>6</sup> *De ord.* 1.8.23.

she commands that she be sought. Whence indeed and where can she not give a signal?<sup>7</sup>

It is in the search for its signal (sign) that these viewers are attracted by the ‘beauteous reason’: this beauty demands them to seek for itself. The emphasis on the things, involving the movement of irrational animals and the defeated, which are ‘beautiful and in harmony with nature’s laws’ is found on the basis of this spectacle, and in the following section their main interest is directed to the senses to be led to deeper reflections on the ordered state of things and ‘that beauty most true’.

These setting texts show evidence that the reader is encouraged to interpret the things and events in their surroundings: not only do these signs show them the feature of the corporeal world, but also realise the importance of the negative aspect in the divine order, that is, the ‘evident’ order of what seems to be unusual and apart from order. Those who remain in darkness, the filth of this world, deformed in a fight, can love truth and perform the search for knowledge of God, to ‘pray to be converted to God and to see His face’ (1.8.23), and to be beautiful, although defeated in a fight. The scenic settings in this dialogue thus provide a mode of thinking that could lead them from the perceptible things to the intelligible at the highest level. Through the manifestation of the divine order, these settings express encouragement and exhortation to participants of discussions and serve to remind them of something in an all-embracing order, that is, the omnipotent creator.

### *The core of ‘artes liberales’ programme*

Discussion (D) on the third day begins by reconsidering a proposition: ‘what is to be with God.’ Their talk ranges from the ‘movement’ to the issue of divine providence and falls into perplexity. Monica refers to this difficulty as follows:

whether order was with God, or whether it began to be from time when evil began, yet the evil arose apart from order. If you grant this, you acknowledge that something can be done apart from order, and this weakens your case, and cuts it down. But, if you do not grant it, then evil begins to appear to have had its origin by the order of God, and nothing occurs to me more detestable than that sacrilege.<sup>8</sup>

Augustine confirms that his fellows have been ‘preposterous and out of order’ (2.7.24) and advises them to hold the order of philosophical inquiry, by which they come to the wisdom. He turns to deliver the monologue (C and D) in which he outlines at length the order of discipline, that is, a course of liberal arts study. As there is doubt about whether Augustine resolves this

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<sup>7</sup> *De ord.* 1.8.25.

<sup>8</sup> *De ord.* 2.7.23.

difficulty, so the discussion (D) is interrupted and followed by a concluding speech. However, it seems rather strange that this lengthy monologue has nothing to do with their failure to solve the problem and that the author Augustine has no intention of directing the course of conversations when the discussants face with their primary concern. At the same time, there is a further question on my mind: when he sketches the content of liberal arts programme, does Augustine require them to learn such material to consider the problem of providence? What is the intention of providing the outline of grammar, geometry and so on?

It is interesting to note that both Monologues C and D are a more detailed explanation of the order of discipline rather than that of Monologue B. How does the monologue B start? Augustine poses the same dilemma about theodicy for Trygetius in its beginning (2.4.11). Unlike Licentius who falls silent (2.7.23: 'he had nothing to say, and gave himself to silence.' FC 5, 300), Trygetius answers immediately that if one 'raises the *eyes of the mind* and broadens his *field of vision* and surveys all things as a whole, then he will find nothing unarranged, unclassified, or unassigned to its own place.' (2.4.11, FC 5, 287): one will find all things governed and ordered by divine providence. What is the implication of these different responses and beginnings? If we suppose that there is the author's consistent intention, the result is that while the author makes Trygetius express the idea directly connected with the view of order, the author intends to develop a more effective course of encouraging and persuading the reader of the necessity of order in the case of Licentius. His vision is expressed through their silence and embarrassment. He attempts to interrelate two types of induction by prompting them to think again about Trygetius's answer. With Licentius's embarrassment, Augustine reminds them of Licentius's absence, when Trygetius formulates his view (2.7.21). This effective repetition of the turn to monologue, thus, enables the reader to raise concerns about the monologue and remind them of the core of his argument previously presented.

My interpretation is that Augustine explains deliberately and carefully the heart of disciplines, lest anyone is confused with his primary interest not to learn the expansive realm and various objects of liberal arts, but in the pursuit itself that express the nature of rational beings.

And, lest anyone think that we have embraced something very extensive, I say this plainly and in a few words: that no one ought to aspire to a knowledge of those matters without that twofold science, so to speak—the science of right reasoning and that of the power of numbers. And, if anyone thinks that this is indeed a great deal, let him master either numbers alone or only dialectics. But, if even this seems limitless, let him merely get a thorough understanding of what unity in numbers is, and what its import is—not yet in that supreme law and order of all things, but in the things that we think and do here and there every day. The science of philosophy

has already adopted this learning and has discovered in it nothing more than what unity is, but in a manner far more profound and sublime. (FC 5, 323–324)<sup>9</sup>

Here Augustine obviates the necessity of learning all seven liberal arts to undertake philosophy. He would first claim that one should not desire to examine the dilemma of theodicy without ‘twofold science, so to speak—the science of right reasoning and that of the power of members’. He then reduces the number from two to one:

1. Seven liberal arts;
2. dialectic and science of numbers (arithmetic);
3. dialectic or arithmetic;
4. Unity in everyday life.

To see what Augustine is suggesting, we begin with considering the reason why ‘right reasoning’, namely, the dialectic and the science of numbers occupy the privileged position in its order and then proceed to think what he means by ‘unity’ in everyday life.

As to the former, Augustine tells a parable to present the productive aspect of liberal arts: Reason has the power by which it produces art. It begins by creating grammar.

How, therefore, would it pass on to other discoveries, unless it first classified, noted, and arranged its own resources—its tools and machines, so to speak—and bring into being that discipline of disciplines which they call *dialectics*? (FC 5, 315)<sup>10</sup>

Here dialectic is born. It ‘teaches both how to teach and how to learn’. (2.13,38) It considers various types of argument developed in the realm of arts and searches out dialectic itself. There exists a circulative structure, in which dialectic reflects on itself. Moreover, dialectic is called the ‘discipline of disciplines’. Because it forms the basis of other disciplines and tests the method of argument used by other arts. Hence, it cannot ‘pass on to other discoveries [...] and bring into being that discipline of disciplines’ (2.13,38; FC 5, 315): dialectic is unique among the disciplines, for its object of study is our intellectual activities.

As to the latter, that is, the science of numbers (arithmetic), it also stands at the centre of disciplines, but for a different reason. It is evident from his description that geometry, music, astronomy and arithmetic form a set of disciplines, in so far as all are concerned with numbers (2.15,43) Music is defined as a discipline of using numbers to analyse relations between sounds in time, regarding rhythm or harmony. Geometry applies numbers to bodies in space. Astronomy utilises numbers to the analysis of the movement of heavenly bodies through space and time. And the science of numbers, arithmetic, studies numbers themselves. So, there is a

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<sup>9</sup> *De ord.* 2.8.47.

<sup>10</sup> *De ord.* 2.13,38.

progression from bodies to sounds and stars and the numbers themselves, to the last of which Augustine directs his attention to think about the rational processes themselves: 'The movement of the heavens also aroused and invited reason to consider it diligently.' (2.15.42) Therefore, the science of numbers has a privileged status in these disciplines. It is interesting to note that, although it deals with the unity and power of numbers, other three disciplines would be reduced this discipline, arithmetic. In fact, he goes further, not only emphasising the importance of thinking about numbers themselves but also applying these processes to the reflection about rational ability to study these disciplines.

Then, what is the 'unity in number, and what its import is [...] in the things that we think and do here and there every day' (2.18.47)? While devoting to the science of numbers, one realises that s/he is manipulating numbers and trying to see how numbers fit together in the 'unified' wholes. While devoting to dialectic, one divides and combines to find definitions. In either case, one is making strength in the attempt to find something, a 'unified' definition of a thing. Augustine provides simple examples of what he means:

In order that a stone be a stone, all its parts and its entire nature have been consolidated into one. What about a tree? Is it not true that it would not be a tree if it were not one? What about the members and entrails of any animate being, or any of its component parts? Of a certainty, if they undergo a severance of unity, it will no longer be an animal. (FC 5, 325)<sup>11</sup>

Augustine proposes a theoretical frame for the structure of reality: unity is the cause of things whatever people encounter and experience in their everyday life. When people pay attention to things, for example, a musical interval, they find that it is composed of two notes in a unified proportion. They could say the same thing in a discipline such as grammar. It has its parts rationally arranged through its dialectical processes. Although these disciplines deal with different kinds of structure, each of these things reveals unity in its particular aspect. Augustine maintains that while inquiring into these things, we are attempting to reveal the unity conceived in the structure of each; while reflecting on the act of inquiry per se, we realise that we are adopting various types of dialectical procedure to find expressions of unity, thereby defining the rationality of human beings in terms of the search for a unity.

Augustine goes further to suggest the necessity of the search for unity. Since unity is the origin of everything, it is indispensable to human nature to seek the first cause of everything.

To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the second, of God. The first makes us know ourselves; the second, our origin. The former is the more delightful to us; the latter, more precious. The former makes us fit for a happy life; the latter renders us happy. The first is for beginners; the latter, for the well

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<sup>11</sup> *De ord.* 2.18.48.



instructed. This is the order of wisdom's branches of study by which one becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to discern two worlds and the very Author of the universe [...] (FC 5, 324)<sup>12</sup>

By looking for expressions of unity in everyday life around us, we realise that the goal of the rational activity is to search for unity itself and that to know unity is to be happy. He states that 'The soul, therefore, holding fast to this order, and now devoted to philosophy, at first introspects itself'. (2.18.48; FC 5, 324) Indeed, what his fellows in this dialogue lack is self-knowledge. If they could follow the order of discipline and search for unity in their lives, they would be in the proper position to consider the issue of divine providence. Augustine's description of unity in the monologue D teaches the reader about the fact that the world is good for human beings, that is, the 'beauty' of the world (2.19.51) and leads them into the significance of rational activity that could be developed by the study of liberal arts. In order to make progress towards the goal, to articulate an account of providence, we are not required to follow the course of liberal arts, but to engage in the rational activity and focus on the reflection of this activity that teaches us about ourselves.

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<sup>12</sup> *De ord.* 2.18.47.

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*Texts*

*De ord.* 1.1.3:

Ordinem rerum, Zenobi, cum sequi ac tenere cuique proprium tum uero uniuersitatis, quo cohercetur hic mundus et regitur, uel uidere uel pandere difficillimum hominibus atque rarissimum est.

Trans.: ‘To perceive and to grasp the order of reality proper to each thing, and then to see or to explain the order of the entire universe by which this world is truly held together and governed—that, Zenobius, is a very difficult and rare achievement for men.’ (FC 5, 239)

*De ord.* 2.1.1:

tum uero in quadam disputatione non paruae rei, quam die natali meo cum conuiuis habui atque in libellum contuli, tanta mihi mens eius apparuerat, ut nihil aptius uerae philosophiae uideretur.

Trans.: It was particularly on the occasion of a rather important disputation which I had held on my birthday with my companions, and which I have compiled into a little book, that her mind had been revealed to me as so rare that nothing seemed more adapted for true philosophy. (FC 5, 273)

*Contra academicos* 2.4.10:

Post pristinum sermonem, quem in primum librum contulimus, septem fere diebus a disputando fuimus otiosi, cum tres tamen Vergilii libros post primum recenseremus atque, ut in tempore congruere uidebatur, tractarem.

Trans.: After the initial disputation—which we have compiled into the first book—we discontinued the discussion for about seven days, since we were engaged in reviewing the second, third and fourth books of Virgil, and in discoursing upon them as seemed fitting at the proper time. (FC 5, 143)

*De ord.* 1.3.6–7:

Sed nocte quadam, cum euigilassem de more mecumque ipse tacitus agitarem, quae in mentem nescio unde ueniebant — [...] ergo, ut dixi, uigilabam, cum ecce aquae sonus pone balneas, quae praeterfluebat, eduxit me in aures et animaduersus est solito adtentius. [...] cum Licentius lecto suo inportunos percusso iuxta ligno sorices terruit seseque uigilantem hoc modo indicauit. [...] Nam et ipse in eodem conclauis lecto suo cubans uigilabat nobis nescientibus — erant enim tenebrae — quod in Italia etiam pecuniosis prope necesse est. Ergo ubi uidi scholam nostram,

quantacumque aderat — nam et Alypius et Nauigius in urbem ierant — etiam illis horis non sopitam, et me cursus ille aquarum aliquid de se dicere admonebat.

Trans.: Then, one night when, as was my wont, I had awakened from sleep and was silently revolving what was entering my mind somehow or other— [...] I was awake, therefore, as I said, when the sound of water flowing past at the rear of the baths came to my ears, and it was noticeably louder than usual. [...] when Licentius, striking his bed with a piece of wood nearby, frightened some troublesome mice, and thus showed that he was awake. [...] He [Trygetius], too, was lying awake in his bed in the same room, although we knew it not, because we were in darkness; in Italy, this is almost a necessity even for the wealthy. Therefore, when I saw that our school—as much as was left of it, for Alypius and Navigius had gone to the city—was not in slumber even at that hour, the running of the waters reminded me to say something on the subject. (FC 5, 244–245)

*De ord.* 1.8.23:

Mihi, inquam, neque hoc displicet et ad illum ordinem puto pertinere, ut etiam hinc aliquid diceremus. Nam illi cantico et locum ipsum, quo illa offensa est, et noctem congruere uideo. A quibus enim rebus putas nos orare ut conuertamur ad deum eiusque faciem uideamus, nisi a quodam ceno corporis atque sordibus et item tenebris, quibus nos error inuoluit?

Trans.: ‘That also,’ I replied, ‘Is not displeasing to me. And that we say something on that very point is, I believe, quite in accordance with order itself, for I see that the place itself by which Monica was offended, and the night also, have a fittingness with reference to that chant: for what, indeed, do you think that we pray to be converted to God and to see His face, if not from a certain uncleanness of the body and its stains, and likewise from the darkness in which error has involved us?’ (FC 5, 260)

*De ord.* 1.8.25:

deo cotidianis uotis ire coeperamus in balneas — ille enim locus nobis, cum caelo tristi in agro esse minime poteramus, aptus ad disputandum et familiaris fuit — cum ecce ante fores aduertimus gallos gallinatos ineuntes pugnam nimis acrem. Libuit attendere. Quid enim non ambiunt, qua non peragrant oculi amantum, ne quid undeunde innuat pulchritudo rationis cuncta scientia et nescientia modificantis et gubernantis, quae inhiantes sibi sectatores suos trahit quacumque atque ubique se quaeri iubet? Nam unde aut ubi non potest signum dare? Ut in eisdem ipsis gallis erat uidere intenta proiectius capita, inflatas comas, uehementes ictus, cautissimas euitationes et in omni motu animalium rationis expertium nihil non decorum quippe alia ratione desuper omnia moderante.

Trans.: And, when our daily prayers to God had been said, we began to go to the baths, for that place was comfortable and suitable for our disputation, whenever we could not be in the field because of inclement weather. Suddenly, we noticed barnyard cocks beginning a bitter fight just in front of the door. We chose to watch. For what do the eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty] not encompass; where do they not search through to see beauteous reason signaling something thence?—reason which rules and governs all things, the knowing and the unknowing things, and which attracts her eager followers in every way and wherever she commands that she be sought. Whence indeed and where can she not give a signal?—as was to be seen in those fowls: the lowered heads stretched forward, neck plumage distended, the lusty thrusts, and such wary parryings, and, in every motion of the irrational animals, nothing unseemly—precisely because another Reason from on high rules over all things. (FC 5, 262–263)

*De ord. 2.1.1:*

Interpositis deinde pauculis diebus uenit Alypius et exorto sole clarissimo inuitauit caeli nitor et, quantum in illis locis hieme poterat, blanda temperies in pratum descendere quo saepius et familiarius utebamur.

Trans.: After a very few days, Alypius returned. And a very clear sun having risen, the brightness of the skies and the warmth of the air—insofar as was possible in these localities in the winter season—invited us out to the lawn, which we used freely and frequently. (FC 5, 273)

*De ord. 2.7.23:*

Nam siue apud deum fuit ordo siue ex illo tempore esse coepit, ex quo etiam malum, tamen malum illud praeter ordinem natum est. Quod si concedis, fateris aliquid praeter ordinem posse fieri, quod causam tuam debilitat ac detruncat; si autem non concedis, incipit dei ordine natum malum uideri et malorum auctorem deum fateberis, quo sacrilegio mihi detestabilius nihil occurrit.

Trans.: whether order was with God, or whether it began to be from time when evil began, yet the evil arose apart from order. If you grant this, you acknowledge that something can be done apart from order, and this weakens your case, and cuts it down. But, if you do not grant it, then evil begins to appear to have had its origin by the order of God, and nothing occurs to me more detestable than that sacrilege. (FC 5, 299–300)

*De ord. 2.8.47:*

Et ne quisquam latissimum aliquid nos complexos esse arbitretur, hoc dico planius atque breuius, ad istarum rerum cognitionem neminem adspirare debere sine illa quasi duplici scientia bonae disputationis potentiaeque numerorum. Si quis etiam hoc plurimum putat, solos numeros

optime nouerit aut solam dialecticam. Si et hoc infinitum est, tantum perfecte sciat, quid sit unum in numeris quantumque ualeat nondum in illa summa lege summoque ordine rerum omnium, sed in his, quae cotidie passim sentimus atque agimus. Excipit enim hanc eruditionem iam ipsa philosophiae disciplina et in ea nihil plus inueniet, quam quid sit unum, sed longe altius longeque diuinius.

Trans.: And, lest anyone think that we have embraced something very extensive, I say this plainly and in a few words: that no one ought to aspire to a knowledge of those matters without that twofold science, so to speak—the science of right reasoning and that of the power of numbers. And, if anyone thinks that this is indeed a great deal, let him master either numbers alone or only dialectics. But, if even this seems limitless, let him merely get a thorough understanding of what unity in numbers is, and what its import is—not yet in that supreme law and order of all things, but in the things that we think and do here and there every day. The science of philosophy has already adopted this learning and has discovered in it nothing more than what unity is, but in a manner far more profound and sublime. (FC 5, 323–324)

*De ord.* 2.13.38:

Quando ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda, nisi ipsa sua prius quasi quaedam machinamenta et instrumenta distingueret notaret digereret proderetque ipsam disciplinam disciplinarum, quam dialecticam uocant?

Trans.: How, therefore, would it pass on to other discoveries, unless it first classified, noted, and arranged its own resources—its tools and machines, so to speak—and bring into being that discipline of disciplines which they call dialectics? (FC 5, 315)

*De ord.* 2.18.48:

Lapis ut esset lapis, omnes eius parses omnisque nature in unum solidata est. Quid arbor? Nonne arbor non esset, si una non esset? Quid membra cuiuslibet animantis ac uiscera et quicquid est eorum, e quibus constat? Certe si unitatis patiantur diuortium, non erit animal.

Trans.: In order that a stone be a stone, all its parts and its entire nature have been consolidated into one. What about a tree? Is it not true that it would not be a tree if it were not one? What about the members and entrails of any animate being, or any of its component parts? Of a certainty, if they undergo a severance of unity, it will no longer be an animal. (FC 5, 325)

*De ord.* 2.18.47:

Cuius duplex quaestio est, una de anima, altera de deo. Prima efficit, ut nosmet ipsos nouerimus, altera, ut originem nostram. Illa nobis dulcior, ista carior, illa nos dignos beata uita, beatos haec facit, prima est illa discentibus, ista iam doctis. Hic est ordo studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit

quisque idoneus ad intellegendum ordinem rerum, id est ad dinoscendos duos mundos et ipsum parentem uniuersitatis, [...]

Trans.: To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the second, of God. The first makes us know ourselves; the second, our origin. The former is the more delightful to us; the latter, more precious. The former makes us fit for a happy life; the latter renders us happy. The first is for beginners; the latter, for the well instructed. This is the order of wisdom's branches of study by which one becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to discern two worlds and the very Author of the universe [...] (FC 5, 324)